3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDM 21031 Ventura Blvd., Suite 340 Woodland Hills, CA 91364 Phone: 323-306-4234 Fax: 866-633-0228 tfriedman@toddflaw.com mgeorge@toddflaw.com abacon@toddflaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff UNITED STATES E CENTRAL DISTRIC FATIMA ALMAZAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly	DISTRICT COURT
12	and on behalf of all others similarly situated,	CLASS ACTION
13	Plaintiffs,	COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
14 15 16 17 18	v. SUNPATH LTD.; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, Defendant.	AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PURSUANT TO THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
19	Introduction	
 20 21 22 23 24 25 	1. FATIMA ALMAZAN ("Plaintiff") brings this Class Action Complaint for damages, injunctive relief, and any other available legal or equitable remedies, resulting from the illegal actions of SUNPATH LTD. ("Defendant"), in negligently and willfully contacting Plaintiff on Plaintiff's cellular telephone, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., ("TCPA") and related regulations. Plaintiff alleges as follows upon personal knowledge as to herself and her own acts and experiences, and, as to all other	

- 2. The TCPA was designed to prevent calls and messages like the ones described within this complaint, and to protect the privacy of citizens like Plaintiff. "Voluminous consumer complaints about abuses of telephone technology for example, computerized calls dispatched to private homes prompted Congress to pass the TCPA." *Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC*, 132 S. Ct. 740, 744 (2012).
- 3. In enacting the TCPA, Congress intended to give consumers a choice as to how creditors and telemarketers may call them, and made specific findings that "[t]echnologies that might allow consumers to avoid receiving such calls and messages are not universally available, are costly, are unlikely to be enforced, or place an inordinate burden on the consumer. TCPA, Pub.L. No. 102–243, § 11. Toward this end, Congress found that

[b]anning such automated or prerecorded telephone calls to the home, except when the receiving party consents to receiving the call or when such calls are necessary in an emergency situation affecting the health and safety of the consumer, is the only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion.

Id. at § 12; see also Martin v. Leading Edge Recovery Solutions, LLC, 2012 WL 3292838, at* 4 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 10, 2012) (citing Congressional findings on TCPA's purpose).

- 4. Congress also specifically found that "the evidence presented to the Congress indicates that automated or prerecorded calls are a nuisance and an invasion of privacy, regardless of the type of call...." *Id.* at §§ 12-13. *See also Mims*, 132 S. Ct. at 744.
- 5. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court interpreted the term "automatic telephone dialing system" and held that "[t]o qualify as an 'automatic telephone dialing system,' a device must have the capacity either to store a

telephone number using a random or sequential generator *or* to produce a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator." *Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid*, 141 S.Ct. 1163 (2021) (emphasis added).

- 6. In *Duguid*, the Supreme Court provided an example of such systems, stating: "For instance, an autodialer might use a random number generator to determine the order in which to pick phone numbers from a preproduced list. It would then store those numbers to be dialed at a later time." *Id.* at 1171-72 fn. 7.
- 7. Further, both *Duguid* and the legislative history of the TCPA are clear that the original focus on prerecorded voice technology prohibition was the fact that such communications involved agentless calls, not on the question of whether a literal voice was used during those agentless calls. *See* Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, United States Senate One Hundred Second Congress First Session July 24, 1992, Testimony of Robert Bulmash and Steve Hamm at pg 11; 7 FCC Rcd. 8752 (F.C.C. September 17, 1992).
- 8. The Sixth Circuit has also recognized this distinction: "Congress drew an explicit distinction between 'automated telephone calls that deliver an artificial or prerecorded voice message' on the one hand and 'calls place by 'live' persons' on the other." *Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Dist. 1199 WV/KY/OH*, 708 F.3d 737,743 (6th Cir. 2013).
- 9. Similarly, the FTC has observed that "prerecorded calls are by their very nature one-sided conversations, and if there is no opportunity for consumers to ask questions, offers may not be sufficiently clear for consumers to make informed choices before pressing a button or saying yes to make a purchase." 73 FR 51164-01, 51167 (Aug. 29, 2008).

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action

11. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Central District of California pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and 1441(a) because Defendant does business within the State of California and Plaintiff resides within this district.

PARTIES

- 12. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein, was a citizen and resident of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a "person" as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (39). Plaintiff was physically in California at the time she received the alleged call from Defendant.
- 13. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant is a corporation of the State of Delaware. Defendant, and all of its agents, are and at all times mentioned herein were "persons," as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (39). Plaintiff alleges that at all times relevant herein, Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in the County of Orange, and within this judicial district.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

- 14. On or about January 27, 2022, Plaintiff received an incoming call from Defendant on her cellular telephone number ending in -4892.
- 15. Defendant's call consisted of an artificial and/or prerecorded voice message seeking to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant's products and/or services.
- 16. Defendant did not have Plaintiff's prior express consent to contact her on her cellular phone.
- 17. Based on the content of Defendant's call, specifically the use of an artificial voice message, Plaintiff alleges that it was placed using an "automatic telephone dialing system," ("ATDS") as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).

- 18. The telephone number that Defendant, or their agent called was assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs charges for incoming texts and calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).
- 19. Defendant's call was not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i).
- 20. Plaintiff was never a customer of Defendant and never provided her cellular telephone number to Defendant for any reason whatsoever. Accordingly, Defendant and their agents never received Plaintiff's prior express consent to receive unsolicited telemarketing calls, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

- 21. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed Class ("Class").
- 22. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, defined as follows: all persons within the United States who received any unsolicited telemarketing calls placed using an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice from Defendant, which call was not made for emergency purposes or with the recipient's prior express consent within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint through the date of class certification.
- 23. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter.
- 24. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definitions to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery.

- 25. The joinder of all Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the court. The Class can be identified through Defendant's records or Defendant's agents' records.
- 26. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through their agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using solicitation/marketing calls, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby.
- 27. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the Class members. The questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following:
 - a) Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of class certification, Defendant or their agents made any calls (other than a call or message made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to any Class member using any automatic dialing system or artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a cellular phone service;
 - b) Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation; and
 - c) Whether Defendant and their agents should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future.
- 28. As a person that received at least one solicitation call without Plaintiff's prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class.

- 29. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant's unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size of the individual member's claims, few, if any, members of the Class could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein.
- 30. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.
- 31. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and California law. The interest of the Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant are small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class claims.
- 32. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227(B)

- 33. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein.
- 34. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b).

- 35. As a result of Defendant's negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to an award of \$500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).
- 36. Plaintiff and the Class members are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227(B)

- 37. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein.
- 38. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b).
- 39. As a result of Defendant's knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to an award of \$1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).
- 40. Plaintiff and the Class members are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court grant Plaintiff, and members of the Classes, the following relief against Defendant:

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(B)

• As a result of Defendant's negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member \$500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).

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- Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future.
- Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(B)

- As a result of Defendant's knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member \$1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).
- Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future.
- Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

TRIAL BY JURY

41. Pursuant to the seventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, Plaintiff is entitled to, and demands, a trial by jury.

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Dated: June 30, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

THE LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.

By: s/ Todd M. Friedman TODD M .FRIEDMAN, ESQ. ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF